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Abstract
Competition is being extended into residential utility markets world-wide; the European directives
on telecoms, electricity and gas will extend choice throughout the European Union by the turn of
the century. In the UK, the Privatisation Acts not only changed the ownership of utilities, but
imposed a duty on the regulators to encourage competition. It is the introduction of competition,
actual and potential, that has been the main force behind changing the relative prices charged to
different consumers, particularly in the residential market. We use household-level data to identify
the distributional impact, particularly on vulnerable households and those for whom regulators
have special responsibilities. We find a mixed outcome, with some vulnerable households,
especially pensioners, adversely affected; we suggest potential compensation mechanisms that
could improve welfare by enabling the benefits of competition in these industries supplying
essential services to be gained without harming the most vulnerable households.
JEL classification: D40, I18.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent reform of UK utilities has included both a change from public to private
ownership and the introduction of competition. In residential markets,
liberalisation followed some time after flotation, and we distinguish the effects
of changing the ownership of the industries while they still retained monopoly
power from the impact of allowing entry to the markets they served. This process
has implications for utilities world-wide that are ‘deregulating’ markets to
introduce competition across a wide spectrum of consumers, both as part of the
European Union initiative for competition and in the United States. Similar
patterns have been seen somewhat earlier in industrial markets, but we
concentrate here on the residential sector.
The utility industries provide essential services for households, and the
natural monopoly inherent in their delivery requires control through public
ownership or regulation of private companies. Expenditure on utilities increases
with income, but less than proportionally, so that the proportion of household
income devoted to these services declines with increasing income. In Great
Britain, regulation is entrusted to industry-specific regulators with
responsibilities that include introducing competition where feasible and
protecting the interests of consumers where it is not. Consumer protection
includes a secondary duty to take account of the interests of those of pensionable
age, consumers with disabilities or chronic illness and (for water and electricity)
those in rural areas; regulators have no specific responsibilities for income
distribution or social policies.
In telecoms, the incumbent — British Telecom (BT) — was threatened with
increased likelihood of entry from the date of flotation in 1984, but suffered only
minor inroads into its markets until the mid-1990s; statutory monopoly remained
in most of the residential markets for gas, supplied by British Gas (BG), and
electricity, supplied by 14 regional electricity companies, until 1998. Consumers
in markets with monopoly power were protected by caps imposed on an average
of prices charged for monopoly services, and the companies were free to
rebalance their tariffs within this aggregate, subject to some limitations. In
markets without serious threat of entry, companies generally conformed to the
constraints by changing the constituent prices within the cap in line with each
other, maintaining the relative relationships between them.
1
Regulators have recently concentrated their efforts on introducing
competition wherever feasible, i.e. enabling competitive supply through access
to the natural monopoly elements (pipes, wires and local switches) which
constitute an essential facility for competitors to deliver services to consumers.
As such competition threatens, incumbents have started to change prices
                                                                                                                                   
1We detect no consistent rebalancing by water companies, whose monopoly supply of the residential market is
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differentially to different consumers, rebalancing prices within the aggregate
constraints imposed by the regulator. Such price-rebalancing by incumbents in
response to entry (and by entrants in targeting consumers) has a differential
impact on different households because of variations in their consumption of
these commodities and the way in which they pay for them. We examine the
changes in tariffs that competition engenders, the efficiency of these changes and
their impact on different household groups, and distributional effects. Some
studies (for example, Drakeford (1996)) have identified qualitatively the effects
of changes on some households. Others have focused on particular industries
(Hancock and Waddams Price, 1995; Burns, Crawford and Dilnot, 1995; Gómez-
Lobo, 1996; Wolak, 1996). We discuss the cumulative effect of increasing
competition across the residential utility sector using household-level data from
the Family Expenditure Survey. We find regressive effects from rebalancing,
with particularly adverse effects on pensioner households, and identify the need
for some intervention which might be determined by the current government
review of regulation in the UK. The paper is organised as follows. The next
section describes the price changes that have occurred, Section III the data and
methodology and Section IV the impact of price-rebalancing at household level.
Section V discusses future changes and suggests some remedies.
II. CHANGES IN RELATIVE PRICES
The privatised energy utilities inherited from their nationalised predecessors a
pattern of uniform pricing in the residential sector that largely ignored cost
differences of geographic location, payment method and ‘peakiness’ of demand.
In both telecoms and energy, prices for remaining attached to the system (line
rentals and standing charges) were generally below costs, with the difference
recovered through higher usage rates (Burns, Crawford and Dilnot, 1995). Such
uniform prices were implicitly regarded as a form of welfare in which some
consumers subsidised others, a policy common in nationalised industries but not
generally practised in the private sector. The change in objectives and constraints
would be expected to lead to some rebalancing when the industries are privatised
and reregulated (see, for example, Bradley and Price (1988) and Armstrong,
Cowan and Vickers (1994)). BT increased its line rental by as much as the
regulator permitted; however, gas and electricity companies did not rebalance
their prices to increase cost-reflectiveness immediately after privatisation.
The maintenance of cross-subsidies could be explained by political
motivation to avoid bad publicity, particularly at a time when the industries were
heavily criticised for large payments to senior executives. Or they could have
been retained for strategic political reasons, to oppose the introduction of
competition in the future. If liberalising the markets could be blamed for erosion
of cross-subsidies — a process that would hurt a significant number of
vulnerable consumers — then politicians might be less willing to introduceFiscal Studies
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competition, as suggested by Laffont and Tirole (1993). However, once the
political argument is lost and the market is opened to new entrants, they will find
most attractive the markets with the highest mark-ups, in this case the low-cost
consumers. Incumbents seek to rebalance prices, decreasing them to markets
where new entry has occurred or is threatened, and increasing them elsewhere to
maintain revenue.
The timing of price changes supports our contention that it is competition
rather than privatisation that has triggered price-rebalancing. BT has consistently
rebalanced between line rental and call charges to the maximum extent permitted
under its price constraint; the only exception was when price changes were
avoided altogether for other reasons (Bradley and Price, 1987). In the first 12
years after privatisation, throughout which it faced increasing competitive
pressure, BT increased its line rentals by 7 per cent in real terms and reduced the
average cost of calls by 40 per cent. In the 15 months since the Office of
Telecommunications (Oftel) removed the specific constraint on line rentals,
these have already risen in real terms. The full pattern of price changes for BT
since privatisation is shown in Figure 1, where ‘call index’ is the price index for
calls only and ‘telephone expenditure’ is a price index for total telephone
expenditure including the line rental.
British Gas has demonstrated most clearly the relation between competition
and price-rebalancing. It announced major innovations in tariff structures within
24 hours of the Queen’s Speech which confirmed that legislation would enable
competition in residential gas markets. Unlike with BT, these changes did not
alter the balance between the fixed standing charge levied on each consumer and
FIGURE 1
Index of Real Household Telephone Expenses
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TABLE 1
Index of Real Residential Gas Tariffs, by Payment Method
1984 = 100
Standing charge (£ p.a.) Running rate (p/kWh)
Quarterly
credit
Direct debit Prepayment Quarterly
credit
Direct debit Prepayment
Dec. 1994 62 62 67 77 77 76
Jan. 1998 75 39 63 67 61 66
Source: British Gas Annual Accounts and British Gas Trading.
the price paid for units of energy consumed, but altered the balance between
charges for payment by different means. BG introduced a substantial discount
for those paying by direct debit, which has since increased. Table 1 shows
rebalancing in British Gas since 1984 and its acceleration after 1995 when
competition in residential markets was confirmed.
In electricity, the 15 separate public electricity suppliers (PESs), which
presently supply the residential market as regional monopolies, make
straightforward comparisons more difficult. Unlike with gas, there was no
particular moment when the introduction of competition to the market was
determined: it was foreshadowed in the 1989 Electricity Act, though the efforts
of the electricity regulator to ensure that it occurs smoothly in 1998 have
concentrated suppliers’ minds as the date approaches. Rebalancing has, as with
gas, been mainly in the form of discounts for direct debit payers relative to those
paying through prepayment meters or the quarterly credit tariff, as Figure 2
shows for the credit tariff.
FIGURE 2
Ratio of Quarterly Standard Tariff to Direct Debit Tariff:












Changes in Levels of Average Electricity Tariffs (1996 prices)
Source: Electricity Association.
Figure 2 shows how the ratio between quarterly credit and direct debit tariffs
has increased for both the fixed standing charge and the running rate per unit of
fuel consumed, at each year since privatisation, averaged over all the PESs in
England, Wales and Scotland. The relative increase in quarterly credit charges is
small in the period covered (about 9 per cent on average on the standing charge
by 1997) but there is a clear acceleration in rebalancing as the opening of the
residential market in 1998 approaches.
2 The changes identified are likely to
accelerate sharply as competition develops towards the end of the decade,
particularly in energy where the process is only just beginning. Figure 3 shows
the movements in the averages of real standing charge and running rates for the
quarterly credit and direct debit tariffs.
III. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF PRICE CHANGES:
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
We use data from the 1991, 1992 and 1993 Family Expenditure Surveys (FESs)
to explore the distributional impact of residential tariff changes in telecoms, gas
and electricity. The FES is a representative survey of UK households which
interviews around 7,000 households a year, collecting detailed information on
the incomes, expenditure and personal characteristics of household members.
Combining data for three years yields larger sample sizes and permits more
detailed analyses than would otherwise be the case. We have checked for
differences between the years and find little consistent pattern to indicate that we
should not aggregate them, except for the increase in use of prepayment meters
for gas and electricity which is discussed below. Details of our methodology are
                                                                                                                                   
2The slowing-down of the rate of rebalancing in 1997 is likely to reflect uncertainties about pressure from the
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contained in Appendix A. We calculate consumption levels from expenditure
and prevailing prices. Some approximation is involved here since we cannot be
certain which prices were applicable to the latest payment (see Hancock and
Waddams Price (1995)) but we make as much use of the relevant information as
we can to minimise any resulting error.
We measure the impact on individual households of price changes in the
early years of competition and its threat by, so far as possible, pricing
households’ recorded consumption of each commodity at 1996 and pre-
privatisation price structures, measuring the ‘gain’ as the difference between the
former and the latter. This is not an exact measure of welfare gain. Our approach
is as if consumption of gas, electricity and telecoms were completely
unresponsive to changes in their own prices and their prices relative to each
other; the implied utility function involves zero substitutability among these and
other goods. This is clearly a restrictive assumption. However, to the extent that
such demand responses may be small, especially where the price changes
themselves are relatively small, we believe our results are informative about the
distribution of gains. Moreover, the actual price changes that we analyse are
small relative to the large hypothetical changes envisaged by Gómez-Lobo
(1996) and Wolak (1996), and price elasticities are generally estimated to be low
(see, for example, Gómez-Lobo (1996, p. 58)). Banks, Blundell and Lewbel
(1996) suggest that, for small price changes and low elasticities, ignoring
changes in consumption causes only a slight error in estimating welfare
changes.
3
We indicate in Appendix B how our measure of welfare is calculated and its
relation to other commonly used measures of welfare change. Our measure is a
good approximation to consumer surplus, but may overestimate gains for gas and
telecoms and underestimate them for electricity. We have proceeded to average
this welfare measure over a number of consumers, initially within each income
and household group. This represents the average change in cost per household
of purchasing the same quantity of services at the two prices.
Since our emphasis is on the distributional impact, it is only if there are
substantial differences in the scope for substitution between lower- and higher-
income households that our overall conclusions will be wrong. Although we
have quoted studies above that show that low-income consumers are in general
more price-responsive than higher-income groups, we do not believe that this
property affects the estimates significantly. Moreover, the simultaneous price
changes across utilities, particularly within the energy sector, are likely to reduce
the responsiveness of demand to changes in own price.
We have ignored the effects of changes in payment methods over the period
of the study, despite the increasing use of prepayment meters; because the FES is
not a longitudinal survey, we are unable to identify how different households are
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affected. But we note that an increasing proportion of households supplied
through prepayment meters are in the lowest income quintile (Appendix C).
Since supply by this means is generally more expensive than through the credit
tariff, including the effect of switching to prepayment meters would exacerbate
the regressive effects that we identify.
IV. RESULTS: GAINS AND LOSSES OF HOUSEHOLDS FROM PRICE-
REBALANCING SINCE PRIVATISATION
Tables 2 and 3 show how use of utilities, the amount consumed and payment
method are related to income.
TABLE 2





















All 87 135 78 20,300 3,018
Pensioner households 90 89 73 16,400 2,977
On disability benefit 87 130 76 20,300 4,062
On income support 66 140 74 18,800 3,604
Income quintile
Lowest 71 137 74 18,800 3,437
2nd 83 112 75 17,900 3,400
3rd 91 127 78 20,200 3,928
4th 94 133 80 20,800 3,909
Highest 95 163 81 28,300 4,171
Household numbers 17,621 16,155 6,717
a
aWe were able to identify the electricity suppliers of a smaller number of electricity consumers because the
standard FES regions do not often coincide with the boundaries of electricity suppliers. This limitation has also
introduced some bias to our sample, as we discuss below, and limited the scope for regional analysis. Our
sample had a lower consumption level than average because of this restriction, which causes most of Scotland
and the North-West — areas of high electricity consumption — and the whole of southern England — where
incomes and expenditure would be higher — to be omitted. This bias is demonstrated in Appendix D.Liberalising UK Residential Utility Markets
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Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 show that connection to the telephone and gas
systems increases with income;
4 there is a major difference in that all households
have access to telephones (at the same charge) whereas gas supply is
geographically limited. Column 2 — the call-related element — indicates that,
though pensioners are more likely to have a telephone, they use it much less than
average. Amongst the lowest income quintile, telephone ownership is lower than
average but telephone use for those who do have a phone is about average.
Ownership then rises steadily, but use declines and then rises again with income.
Call expenditure at higher income levels may be an underestimate because the
FES reports the latest bill, which represents only part of the expenditure for
those using the services of both the incumbent and a new entrant. This is more
likely among high-income groups since the FES data pre-date significant
penetration by cable companies, which have captured a more representative
cross-section of households than did early entrants in both fixed and mobile
TABLE 3
Payment Method for Gas and Electricity:


















All 4 59 38 11 62 27
Pensioner households 3 70 27 3 79 18
On disability benefit 7 55 38 16 60 24
On income support 12 54 34 29 49 22
Income quintile
Lowest
a 9 5 83 32 6 5 42 0
2 n d 6 6 03 41 1 6 62 3
3rd 3 57 40 7 62 31
4th 2 57 41 5 64 31
Highest 1 61 38 2 68 31
aThe numbers of low-income customers paying by direct debit for gas are higher than reported in Hancock and
Waddams Price (1995), who used 1991 data. However, they are consistent with a survey of the gas market in
South-West England in November 1997 which reported 37 per cent of low-income consumers paying for gas
by direct debit (Waddams Price, 1998) and analysis of the most recent Family Expenditure Survey, for 1995–
96, which shows 30 per cent of the lowest income quintile pay for gas and 17 per cent pay for electricity by this
means.
                                                                                                                                   
4This is based on a positive expenditure reported in the FES. This may underestimate telephone ownership in the




5 Gas use increases with income (column 4), except for lower use by
pensioners, who dominate the second income quintile, but electricity has a
somewhat flatter consumption profile.
The main influence of income in the residential energy sector is on payment
method, as Table 3 shows. Columns 1 and 4 show how much higher than average
are the proportions of low-income households using prepayment meters, and
columns 3 and 6 show how the percentages paying by direct debit increase with
income for both gas and electricity.
To assess the effect of these variations on household groups, we first measure
the total gains for different households since privatisation, from the price
reductions reported in Section II. Table 4 shows the results. The first column
indicates the different household categories as before. The next six columns
show the financial gains for each of the three utilities. For each utility and
household type, the two columns show the average gain or loss per year in
expenditure on that utility and the average proportion of income that this
represents for the group. These are then aggregated over the three utilities in the
penultimate column, and the difference between the gain made by each group
and the average gain is shown in the last column. This involves some
approximation, since the sample of households is different for each utility, but it
provides an indication of average changes for each group.
6
We see that all groups have gained on aggregate through lower prices in these
utilities since privatisation, though these gains are not necessarily directly
attributable to privatisation itself. For example, about three-quarters of the lower
gas costs are attributable to falling North Sea gas costs, and lower oil and coal
prices have reduced the costs of electricity production (Newbery and Pollitt,
1997). In telecoms, the period since privatisation has coincided with enormous
technological change which has reduced costs. Those seeking to establish the
effect of privatisation per se should recall that average water bills increased by
about £70 in the 1989–96 period. We show the combined effect for all four
utilities, including water, in an earlier paper (Waddams Price and Hancock,
1996). We are not seeking to establish whether prices would have fallen by as
much (or more) if the industries had remained in public ownership, but to
examine how prices have moved differentially for different groups because of
the introduction of competition.
To separate the effect of higher consumption levels on welfare gain, we posed
a different counterfactual. This identifies the effect on each household group of
rebalancing between prices, rather than changes in their overall level. It
                                                                                                                                   
5One advantage of using data from the early 1990s is that new entrants had made little penetration in the
market, so minimising the problem of underestimation of telephone use.
6It is not appropriate to aggregate the gains for payment methods, since these represent different households for



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































compares the bills of households under the 1996 price structures with the bills
they would have paid had the relative prices been as they were at privatisation
and the level of revenue for the supplier the same as in 1996. We have thus
abstracted from the effects of privatisation and regulation per se, which we argue
affect the average level of prices through changed incentives and price caps, and
examine merely the effect of changes in structure that are motivated by actual or
anticipated introduction of competition.
The remaining tables in this section show the results of analysing the gains
and losses due solely to rebalancing, keeping the level of prices constant at their
(lower) 1996 levels. In Table 5, columns 1, 2 and 3 present results for each
industry, using the same household categories as in previous tables. These are
aggregated to an ‘indicative total’ for each household group in column 4.
Table 5 shows that pensioner households lose from rebalancing across all
three industries. This is particularly marked in telecoms, where the increase in
line rentals in absolute terms and relative to usage charges has had an adverse
effect, even allowing for low-user rebates. In gas and electricity, the loss arises
mainly from pensioners’ higher use of the quarterly credit rather than direct debit
payment method. We see that quarterly credit customers are losing most, and
TABLE 5
Mean Gains from Price-Rebalancing, Separately for Each Industry since
Privatisation (Consumers Only)










All 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pensioner households –10.5 –1.7 –1.2 –13.4
On disability benefit –1.3 0.0 –1.6 –2.9
On income support 1.9 –0.1 0.0 1.8
Income quintile
Lowest 1.6 –0.7 1.1 2.0
2nd –5.0 –0.4 –0.9 –6.3
3rd –2.5 0.4 –0.3 –2.4
4th –1.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
Highest 6.8 –0.2 –0.7 5.9
Prepayment n/a –3.1 –0.1
Quarterly credit n/a –8.9 –1.7
Direct debit n/a 14.2 4.1
Household numbers 17,621 15,906 6,717Liberalising UK Residential Utility Markets
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direct debit payers gaining most, from rebalancing in the energy sector. Overall,
pensioner households are paying about £13.40 more per year as the result of
rebalancing in these three utilities (together representing about one-third of one
per cent of average income for these households, and just over 0.4 per cent for
those on a basic pension). The other group for which regulators have special
responsibility — disabled people — is also losing, but a much smaller amount —
about £2.90 a year.
Consumers in the lowest income quintile (mainly families on low incomes or
unemployed) have gained marginally from rebalancing, because of their greater
use of the telephone and electricity and through using monthly direct debit
schemes rather than quarterly credit. However, the second income quintile,
containing many of the pensioner households, has lost from rebalancing; above
these quintiles, the aggregate loss decreases and becomes a gain in successively
higher income groups for telecoms, with a similar pattern in energy.
Including non-consumers would reduce the average gain or loss in each
category by adding in households with zero change. This would have the effect
of reducing the average changes most for telecoms and gas in the lowest income
groups, particularly reducing the average gain for telecoms. Some of this effect
is shown in Table D.1 in Appendix D.
Table 6 shows the proportion of each group that is amongst the lowest and
highest quartile of gains. This can be interpreted as the probability that such a
household would be in the group of ‘lowest gainers’ (in fact, these households
lose from rebalancing in all industries) or ‘highest gainers’. If the gains were
distributed neutrally, the probability would be 25 per cent for each group and
category as well as for the sample as a whole. The boundaries for the upper and
lower quartiles and deciles of gains in each industry are shown in the bottom part
of the table.
TABLE 6
Percentage of Each Household Category in Lowest and Highest Quartiles of Gains
(Consumers Only)
Lowest quartile Highest quartile
Telecoms Gas Electricity Telecoms Gas Electricity
A l l 2 52 5 2 5 2 52 5 2 5
Pensioner households 39 24 26 11 15 17
On disability benefit 26 25 28 24 25 27
Boundaries
Lowest quartile –£24.05 –£8.78 –£1.64
Highest quartile £9.03 £12.02 £6.20
Lowest decile –£28.11 –£14.73 –£21.50
Highest decile £34.58 £16.68 £17.26Fiscal Studies
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We see that pensioner households have a probability of nearly 40 per cent of
being in the lowest quartile for telecoms gains (i.e. of losing more than £24 a
year) but only a 11 per cent chance of gaining more than £9 a year. Their
chances of being amongst the highest gainers for gas and electricity (gaining
more than £12 and £6.20 a year, respectively) are also lower than average (15
per cent and 17 per cent). For other households, these proportions are not
markedly different from the 25 per cent average. Moreover, the losses and gains
for those in the bottom and top deciles of gains are considerable: households
falling into the lowest or highest deciles for all three utilities are losing or
gaining more than £60 a year.
The regional impact of price-rebalancing for gas and telecoms (our electricity
sample is too regionally restricted to give useful results) is shown in Table 7,
which presents the mean gain and the probability of being in the lower and upper
quartiles for each industry. Again, the analysis is restricted to consumers only.
The regional figures for telecoms and gas show significant differences in
gains and their distribution between different regions of Great Britain (Northern
Ireland was excluded because energy is supplied there under different
arrangements). Only Greater London and the rest of the South-East have positive
gains from telephone price-rebalancing, with the greatest average losses in the
TABLE 7
Regional Impact of Price-Rebalancing in Telecoms and Gas (Consumers Only)
Mean gain (£ p.a.) Percentage of group in
lowest quartile of gains
Percentage of group in
highest quartile of gains
Telecoms Gas Telecoms Gas Telecoms Gas
A l l 0 . 0 0 . 0 2 52 52 52 5
North –6.1 0.2 31 26 18 24
Yorkshire and
Humberside
–6.0 –1.5 34 30 20 19
North-West –2.2 –1.3 27 28 22 20
East Midlands –4.6 –3.5 29 41 21 11
West Midlands –2.8 –4.9 30 44 21 8
East Anglia –1.8 –0.5 28 23 23 23
Greater London 13.4 0.1 21 20 36 24
Rest of South-East 3.1 2.5 24 17 27 35
South-West –2.0 2.3 26 14 23 32
Wales –3.3 1.6 25 19 23 32
Scotland –0.3 4.2 23 17 21 31
Numbers 17,901 15,906
Boundary –£24.05 –£8.78 £9.03 £12.02Liberalising UK Residential Utility Markets
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North and Yorkshire and Humberside. In these areas, over 30 per cent of
households lose more than £24 a year and only 20 per cent gain more than £9.
For gas, the pattern is rather different, with the South-East, the South-West,
Wales and Scotland gaining at the expense of the rest of the country (our
analysis is based on the situation before any differential price reductions in
South-West England). The losses for the East Midlands and the West Midlands
are particularly striking: an average of £3.50 and £4.90 a year, respectively, with
more than 40 per cent of households losing more than £8.78 and less than 10 per
cent gaining more than £12.
Analysis by type of area (metropolitan areas, high, medium and low density)
did not reveal very different gains and losses for these groups as a whole. Only
the electricity and water regulators have a duty to take account of the needs of
those in rural areas, and analysis of changes in the water industry suggests that
those in rural areas have seen higher price rises than others. However, this is due
not to competition but to different conditions of water supply. It is unfortunate
that our electricity sample is too geographically skewed to yield useful
comparisons of rural and urban households.
V. FUTURE CHANGES IN PRICES, COMPENSATION SCHEMES AND
CONCLUSION
Price-rebalancing removes the cross-subsidies sustained by monopoly. Our
analysis shows differences in the gains for various household groups. So far,
these have been small, but we have argued that much greater changes are likely
to follow. Political sensitivity and fear of regulators’ attentions (both the gas and
electricity regulators and the Energy Minister have commented on charges to
prepayment consumers) may have limited rebalancing, but such constraints will
inevitably be eroded by competitive forces from 1998 as all energy markets are
opened. As deregulation proceeds over the next two years, we can expect
substantially larger changes. The effect of competition will be accentuated by the
requirement for the monopoly elements to make their charges more cost-
reflective. In the summer of 1997, British Gas sought to increase both its charges
to suppliers per residential consumer served and the charges for prepayment
meters. These changes have not yet been implemented, but if they are, they will
further exacerbate the regressive distributional effects, since low-income
households generally consume less gas and are more likely to use prepayment.
So far, rebalancing has been constrained by both explicit and informal
regulatory control. In a market where potentially competitive parts are
completely deregulated and prices of monopoly services are fully cost-reflective,
we might expect between four and 10 times the rebalancing effects observed and
analysed above. We have seen that this will have a negative impact on
pensioners and low-income households. Those paying by regular credit payment
for gas and electricity might lose between £40 and £100 a year, and we haveFiscal Studies
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seen that there are additional pressures to increase the charges to prepayment
meter users.
7 This exacerbates the financial exclusion of households without
bank accounts or poor credit rating who cannot use direct debit payment methods
(Hancock and Waddams Price, 1995). Households in receipt of pensions and
benefits that do not consume these products at all also lose, because the retail
price index (RPI), used to uprate their payments, incorporates the lower average
prices paid for these utilities. We note that the lowest income groups are less
likely to purchase telecoms and gas. Because the RPI reflects substantial average
savings of nearly £200 a year for telecoms and gas since privatisation of these
industries, benefits and pensions are correspondingly lower, although recipients
themselves have not enjoyed the average level of gains.
Moreover, these are average figures for the groups as a whole. The tables
show considerable dispersion in the distribution, suggesting that some
households, particularly those in vulnerable groups, will be worse off as a result
of future rebalancing. These effects are significantly regressive and may impose
considerable hardship on the families concerned. Although comparatively small
compared with other distributional changes over the past 15 years (Atkinson,
1993), they are in the same direction and further exacerbate these regressive
changes.
Because our analysis centres on price changes already implemented, we have
not included differential prices for different parts of the country which are
expected in the gas industry. As carriage costs are reflected more accurately in
gas prices, they will tend to rise in the South-West and Wales, and fall in
Scotland and North-East England. This will counter some of the heaviest
telecoms losses in northern England but exacerbate those in the South-West of
England and Wales. In telecoms, the regulator is likely to continue to impose
uniform prices. The electricity regulator may continue to encourage transmission
charges to be more cost-reflective, raising prices in the South and lowering them
in the North of England.
The rebalancing arises from removing cross-subsidies that have been
practised over decades by the nationalised industries and their privatised
monopoly successors. If deregulation results in oligopoly, it may not necessarily
increase efficiency. Such a possibility makes it even more important that
deregulation proceeds in such a way as to maximise the chance of robust
competition. The regressive distributional effects that we have identified threaten
this process because the present regulatory regime in the UK contains no
appropriate policy tool to rectify the losses. The public outcry over rebalancing
gas prices in the wake of the 1997 Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report
(Observer, 27 July 1997) and the call for regulatory action demonstrate the
                                                                                                                                   
7These larger price changes may challenge some of our assumptions of non-responsiveness of demand, but we
believe our analysis remains indicative of distributional effects.Liberalising UK Residential Utility Markets
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pressure for regulatory intervention, which might prove inappropriate and skew
the development of competition.
One way to provide some compensation for those losers who are in receipt of
pensions and other social security benefits (who constitute some of the most
vulnerable consumers) is through the levels of these benefits. Our analysis
certainly provides a reason to revisit the question of whether annual benefit
upratings should take more account of the expenditure patterns of their recipients
than is implied in the use of the general RPI. Historically, there has always been
resistance to regional variations in benefit levels, making it difficult to address
this aspect of the distributional consequences of tariff-rebalancing through the
benefit system. In the present political climate, one-off increases in benefits
seem unlikely. We would not wish to rule out the possibility of reflecting the
distributional consequences of rebalancing in pension and benefit payments.
However, regulators have special (but unspecified) responsibilities for
pensioners and disabled people; are there appropriate remedies that they could
enact? We suggest two schemes.
Cross-subsidies could be enforced through the monopoly part of the industry,
and each industry will retain such an element (which will engender the necessity
for continued regulation). It would be possible to instruct the monopoly supplier
to continue or impose cross-subsidies (for example, requiring geographic
averaging of prices as in telecoms or enforcing continued cross-subsidy of
prepayment by other energy consumers). A regulator might offer explicit
subsidies for supplying particular groups of ‘vulnerable’ consumers, raising the
money from a general tax on the monopoly element (i.e. other consumers). This
is effectively what the gas regulator does in discouraging BG Transco’s moves to
reflect the higher costs of prepayment meters in its charges to suppliers, and
what the Green Paper on regulation suggests in Chapter 5 (Department of Trade
and Industry, 1998).
A third possibility — capping individual tariffs — is essentially a variation of
such intervention, given the implicit link between prices in different markets
afforded by a cap on average prices or revenue. All three regulators concerned
have used such a mechanism to protect particular groups from rebalancing as
competition develops. The gas and electricity regulators have done so or propose
to do so (Ofgas, 1996; Offer, 1997) by caps on different elements of tariffs,
particularly for those supplied through prepayment meters; the telecoms
regulator has narrowed the price cap so that it encompasses only consumers who
use the telephone relatively less intensively and so have less competition for
their custom (Oftel, 1996). The problem with separate price caps is that they also
constrain the attractiveness of the market to new entrants and so may deny other
benefits of competition to these consumers. Moreover, the way in which
competition develops is strongly influenced by such regulatory intervention,
possibly distorting the development of the market in the longer term. However,Fiscal Studies
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price caps can play an important, limited role in slowing down the speed of
rebalancing while more appropriate compensation mechanisms are introduced.
Each of these regulator-imposed schemes effectively involves the regulator
imposing taxes and subsidies through the monopoly supplier, which might
amount to acting ultra vires. It would also require considerable double-guessing
on the part of the regulator and might lead to some strange inconsistencies if the
regulators acted independently of each other and of government. An additional
policy instrument is needed to mediate the trade-off between efficiency and
equity and to provide some of the welfare functions that the nationalised
industries can no longer perform. We welcome the Trade and Industry
Committee’s suggestion that energy regulators should monitor the development
of competition (Trade and Industry Committee, 1997). Without a co-ordinated
compensation policy, the potential benefits of competition for consumers as a
whole may be gained at the expense of those households least able to afford it,
with consequent implications for social and national cohesion, or may be lost
altogether because of public resistance. Both in the UK and in other countries
opening up markets to competition, there needs to be central co-ordination and
direction on such distributional effects.
APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL APPENDIX — USE OF THE FES
We estimate gas consumption from recorded expenditures and tariffs prevailing
at the times households were interviewed in the Family Expenditure Survey.
Since interviews with households are spread throughout the year, we make a
seasonal adjustment (as described in Hancock and Waddams Price (1995)). This
permits us to look at the distribution of gas consumption as well as average
consumption levels for subgroups of households. For those households that pay
for their gas using a slot meter, we are forced to make a somewhat ad hoc
adjustment to their implied gas consumption. Conversion of their gas
expenditure to consumption using prevailing tariffs tends to overestimate their
consumption, since this method of payment is frequently used as a means of
collecting debt on past consumption. The average of our original estimates for
the consumption of prepayment customers was about twice the corresponding
British Gas figure. We therefore scale down all estimated gas consumption levels
of prepayment customers by 50 per cent.
8 Having arrived at estimates of
consumption levels for each FES household, and knowing which payment
                                                                                                                                   
8Note that the information collected in the FES on slot meter rebates does not help here. First, it relates to rebates in
the last three months. BG aims to assess and give rebates every six months. Thus the FES is likely to identify only
50 per cent of customers who have received rebates in the last year. Second, rebates usually occur once people have
paid off their debt and result from the delay in resetting the meter to normal tariffs. Thus, even if we could identify
all rebates, we would still be left with an overestimate of consumption for those still paying off debt.Liberalising UK Residential Utility Markets
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method each household used, we are then able to estimate expenditure under pre-
and post-privatisation tariff regimes.
In the case of electricity, we need to establish which company supplied each
household in order to apply an appropriate price index. This is done on the basis
of the standard region in which each household lives; our analysis of electricity
is therefore restricted to the six-and-a-half thousand households in Great Britain
where this is possible. At least some consumers in the following regions are
included in our electricity analysis: East Midlands, East Anglia, West Midlands,
Wales, Yorkshire and Humberside, North and Scotland. We have to make a
similar adjustment for those using prepayment meters to that for gas, by reducing
consumption figures by one-third, to bring them into line with information from
Offer about average consumption levels for such consumers.
For telecoms, we use a different approach because it is not possible to use
recorded expenditure to infer consumption levels directly. Our approach is to
construct relevant real
9 price indices, distinguishing fixed and variable elements
as appropriate. These are then applied to recorded expenditure to arrive at
estimates of real expenditure before and after privatisation. For telecoms, we
cannot distinguish between bills paid to different telecoms providers and have
ignored the possibility of non-BT provision. This results in an underestimate of
telecoms expenditure for those whose last bill represents only part of their
expenditure. Any bias will tend to underestimate the gains of high-income
groups and those in Greater London, where penetration by BT’s competitors is
greatest. We are also unable to identify consumption on different kinds of
telephone calls, so have not been able to capture the effect of rebalancing prices
between different call categories (long-distance and local, peak and off-peak).
However, we have included in our analysis the light-user tariffs for telecoms for
households whose expenditure level indicates that they were eligible.
Where households are classified according to income level, this is what is left
of the sum of net income of household members from all sources after the
household’s housing costs have been met. It is adjusted to a ‘per-equivalent-
adult’ basis by an equivalence scale of 1.0 for the first adult in the household, 0.7
for each subsequent adult and child aged 14 or over, and 0.5 for each child under
the age of 14, to allow for household composition. The income is converted to
April 1996 prices according to movements in the all-items RPI. Pensioner
households are those consisting exclusively of one or two persons of state
pension age. Disabled households are those containing at least one person in
receipt of a disability benefit. Households on income support are those where
one or more people receives income support. Table A.1 shows the relation
between income and other household characteristics.
                                                                                                                                   
9That is, indices that reflect price changes relative to general inflation as measured by the all-items RPI.Fiscal Studies
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TABLE A.1




All 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 100
One pensioner 19.7 42.5 16.0 10.6 11.3 100
Two pensioners 12.5 28.3 26.0 17.4 15.9 100
One adult + children 46.4 14.8 11.7 12.2 14.8 100
Other, children under five 30.0 24.1 24.2 13.9 7.8 100
Other, three or more children 17.6 16.5 24.0 24.4 17.4 100
Other 15.6 12.8 20.3 24.9 26.4 100
On disability benefit 13.4 26.0 29.6 20.3 10.7 100
On income support 55.5 26.7 10.6 5.3 1.9 100
APPENDIX B: MEASURING WELFARE CHANGE
Our measure of welfare change for each individual is the difference between
price at privatisation and price in 1996 multiplied by our estimate of
consumption from the Family Expenditure Survey data. Figure B.1 illustrates
this measure and its relation to other standard measures of welfare change. ab is
the uncompensated demand curve; ac represents the demand curve compensated
to keep the consumer at his original (privatisation) utility level; db is the
compensated demand curve at the (higher) 1996 utility level. p1 and p2 are the
(real) prices at privatisation and in 1996, and x1 and x2 are the corresponding
demand levels for each household. We assume that these are normal goods.
x* is the quantity that the household consumed when it was questioned for
the FES. The FES provides expenditure data, and x* is estimated from
knowledge of tariffs prevailing at the time of interview. This consumption level
was realised between the times and the prices when a and b were observed, and
therefore lies between x1 and x2.
Our measure of welfare change is then
). ( * 2 1 p p x W − = ∆
The Laspeyres measure of welfare change is
). ( 2 1 1 p p x L − =Liberalising UK Residential Utility Markets
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FIGURE B.1
Measures of Welfare Change
The Paasche measure is
). ( 2 1 2 p p x P − =
Since x1 < x* < x2, ∆ W lies between the Laspeyres and Paasche indices.
If 
2
* 2 1 x x
x
+
≈ , then ∆ W is close to the Marshallian consumer surplus, ∆ M,
represented by gabceh.
Compensating variation, CV, is gaceh, and the equivalent variation, EV, is
given by gadbceh.
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Since x1 < x3 < x4 < x2, we have the standard result that L < CV < ∆ M < EV < P.
The relative value of our measure, ∆ W, depends on the value of x*. Our
measure of welfare change is close to a Paasche measure if x* ≈  x2 and to a
Laspeyres measure if x*  ≈   x1. In the former case, we are likely to have
overestimated welfare changes; in the latter case, we are likely to have
underestimated them. Expenditure was observed during 1991–93, a time closer
to 1996 than to the dates of privatisation for BT and gas but closer to
privatisation (1990) for the electricity industry. We would therefore expect our
measure to overestimate gains for telecoms and gas and underestimate them for
electricity.
Where we express our measure of welfare change as a proportion of income,
this is unequivalised income after meeting housing costs.
TABLE C.1
Prepayment for Gas and Electricity:
Percentage of Each Category Using Prepayment Meters
Gas Electricity
1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993
A l l 3 4 5 91 01 3
Pensioner households 3 2 4 3 3 4
On disability benefit 6 6 8 14 13 20
On income support 10 11 13 29 26 34
Income quintile
Lowest 7 9 10 22 61 17
2 n d 55899 1 4
3 r d 334489
4 t h 211555
H i g h e s t 111221
Numbers 178 198 246 2,233 2,318 2,166Liberalising UK Residential Utility Markets
317
APPENDIX C: PREPAYMENT FOR GAS AND ELECTRICITY
The only significant difference we detected between the years 1991, 1992 and
1993 was an increasing proportion of consumers using prepayment meters for
gas and electricity. Our data show that, within this, an increasing proportion are
in the lower income groups. The change from credit to prepayment meters is
therefore itself regressive in effect, as more low-income households move onto a
higher cost tariff.
In 1997, the proportion of gas users paying by prepayment meter was 5 per
cent and the corresponding electricity figure was 15 per cent.
APPENDIX D: COMBINING THE INDUSTRIES
We can examine the combined effect of the three industries on the subsample of
households for which we have data consumption on all three industries including
electricity. We know that this is a biased sample (in particular, with households
in the highest income quintile under-represented) but it gives some idea of the
general pattern. The bias emerges largely because of the limited geographical
areas for which we could identify electricity suppliers and tariffs. These exclude
the whole of the South of England, where incomes are highest and gains for
telecoms and gas are greatest. The changes in tariffs in our subsample are similar
to the average for Great Britain as a whole. If the pattern in electricity is similar
to those in gas and telecoms, our subsample excludes a disproportionate number
of those who have benefited from rebalancing and will have a lower range than
the full sample. Moreover, if the gains and losses were constrained to zero for a
more representative group, the average gain for our subsample would almost
certainly be negative for electricity, as we observe for the other two industries.
However, the inclusion of non-consumers corrects a bias in Table 4 which
underestimates the differences between household groups because it aggregates
only the gains and benefits of consumers in each industry, and we have already
seen that those who are on lower incomes are less likely to consume both
telecoms and gas. Moreover, higher-income households spend more on these
services.
A similar pattern emerges to that in previous tables, with relatively high
losses — here, £17.60 on average for pensioner households (about 0.4 per cent
of income). We have also restricted our sample to those who are customers of all
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